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Workmen's Compensation
By George N. Skene*

During the survey period, the appellate courts of Georgia decided about
35 cases and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in one; the General
Assembly passed three workmen's compensation bills in 1975 and none in
1976; and the State Board of Workmen's Compensation opened eight offices throughout the state and staffed each with an administrative law
judge (a new name for directors and deputy directors).
I.

LEGISLATION

The 1975 General Assembly enacted legislation to expand further the
applicability of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The legislation added
certain occupations and increased the maximum number of weeks and the
maximum amount per week;' it brought under the act employees of county
and district health agencies established under Georgia Code chapter 882;2 and it clarified an overlap between the Workmen's Compensation
Board and the Department of Labor, made internal organizational
changes, designated directors and deputy directors as administrative law
judges, and established procedural and evidentiary allowances.'
The 1976 General Assembly relieved us of further changes.
A.

To Whom Applicable

The 1975 General Assembly made the act applicable to all county and
independent school districts and eliminated the requirement that an employer, to be covered, be engaged in a business operated for gain or profit.'
"For the purposes of Workmen's Compensation coverage only, employees
of county and district health agencies, established under the provisions of
Georgia Code Chapter 88-2, are deemed and shall be considered employees
of the State of Georgia." 5
Recognizing the obsolescence of steam as a "motive power," the legisla* Attorney, Macon, Georgia. Mercer University (A.B., 1944); John Marshall Law School
(LL.B., 1960; J.D., 1961).
Georgia Bar.
1. Ga. Laws, 1975, p.
2. Ga. Laws, 1975, p.
3. Ga. Laws, 1975, p.
4. Ga. Laws, 1975, p.
5. Ga. Laws, 1975, p.

Chairman, Insurance Section, Georgia Bar, 1976-77. Member of the
190 et seq.; GA. CODE ANN. §114-404 (Supp. 1976).
1231.
198; GA. CODE ANN. ch. 114-7 (Supp. 1976).
190; GA. CODE ANN. §114-101 (Supp. 1976).
1231; GA. CODE ANN. §114-101 (Supp. 1976).
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ture struck that restriction from a reference to common carriers to which
the act doesn't apply.'
Farm employees, domestic servants and employers with fewer than three
employees still are not covered by the act, but they may be if the employer
and employees agree. The protection and benefits to employers and employees and the low cost to the employer should encourage voluntary submission to the act.
B.

Settlements

Conflicts and controversies arise even with liberal construction of a liberal act written in the greatest detail. The act always has encouraged
settlement or compromise, subject to board approval, of bona fide disputes
where both parties were represented by counsel. The 1975 legislature removed the requirement that both parties be represented 7 and authorized
direct settlements and compromises between the employee and the employer or insurer constituting complete disposition of the claim. Any settlement, to be binding on either party, must be approved by the board.
C.

Limit of Compensation

The maximum weekly compensation for total incapacity was increased
from $80 to $95 for accidents occurring on or after April 1, 1975, and the
limitation of 400 weeks for the maximum period of payments was removed.8 The dollar limit was removed in 1974,1 so now there is no limit on
the total amount of benefits payable to an employee under this section.
The maximum weekly payment for partial incapacity was increased
from $50 to $70, and the total compensation payable was increased from
$15,000 to $24,500.10 The change is applicable to accidents that occur on
and after April 1, 1975.
D.

Hernia

The legislature finally has corrected an error made long ago. Payments
for permanent partial disability after hernia repair now are determined by
the method used for other partial incapacity under Georgia Code §114-405
rather than by the method used for dependents of deceased employees
under Code §114-413."I An ambiguity still exists in the provision in §1146.
7.
8.

Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 192, amending GA. CODE ANN. §114-107.
Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 192; GA. CODE ANN. §114-106 (Supp. 1976).
Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 193; GA. CODE ANN. §114-404 (Supp. 1976).

9.

Ga. Laws, 1974, p. 1145, amending GA. CODE ANN. §114-404. See Smith, Annual Survey

of Georgia Law: Workmen's Compensation, 26 MER. L. REv. 289, 291 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Smith, Workmen's Compensationl.

10.

Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 194; GA. CODE ANN. §114-405 (Supp. 1976).

11.

Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 200; GA. CODE ANN. §114-412 (Supp. 1976).
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412 that "time loss only" is payable in non-fatal cases. But medical expenses also are paid in actual practice.
E.

Death Benefits

Georgia Code §114-413 retains the 400-week limit for payments to dependents of a deceased employee and the same maximum weekly payment
provided in §114-404. The limit on total compensation payable is changed
and is made conditional: "The total compensation payable under this
section to a surviving spouse as a sole dependent at the time of death and
where there is no other dependent for one year or less after the death of
the employee shall in no case exceed $32,500." The previous limit was
$27,500 and applied to every case."
F.

Medical Treatment and Vocational Rehabilitation

Cooperative efforts of several state agencies have provided various, geographically wide-spread facilities, and in 1975 the General Assembly enacted needed and humane requirements for vocational rehabilitation of
employees who were unable to resume their regular jobs after injuries and
were untrained for a new job." The period for vocational rehabilitation
may not exceed 52 weeks unless additional time "appears likely" to complete the training." The reasonable cost of board, lodging and travel must
be paid by the employer. Refusal to accept training may subject the employee to termination, reduction or suspension of his compensation.
For the first time, the act provides for costs (within the dollar limit for
medical) of replacing artificial members, prosthetic devices, and aids damaged or destroyed in a compensable accident, subject to the judgment of
the board. 7 Broken eye-glasses, bent braces, broken arm hooks, and, in
some instances, even damaged wheel chairs should be included without
question.
g.

The Board and Its Functions

Changes in the structure of the board, in the tenure, pay and pensions
of its members, and even in the titles of directors and deputy directors are
included in the amendments and additions to chapter seven of the act.
All three members of the board and all deputy directors now are "adminis12. Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 196; GA. CODE ANN. §114-413 (Supp. 1976). My lengthy study and
serious analysis lead me to conclude that, grammatically and biologically, this cannot be.
13. Ga. Laws, 1974, p. 1152, amending GA. CODE ANN. §114-413. See Smith, Workmen's
Compensation, supra note 9, at 292.
14. Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 196; GA. CODE ANN. §114-501 (Supp. 1976).
15. Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 196; GA. CODE ANN. §114-501 (Supp. 1976).
16. Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 197; GA. CODE ANN. §114-501 (Supp. 1976).
17. Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 196; GA. CODE ANN. §114-501 (Supp. 1976).
18. Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 201 et seq.; GA. CODE ANN. ch. 114-7 (Supp. 1976).
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trative law judges."'" The authority of the Commissioner of Labor over
personnel of the board is revoked and is stated expressly to be advisory
only."0
Amendments to Georgia Code §§114-707 and 114-7081 allow physicians'
reports to be admitted as evidence under certain conditions and provide
that rules of evidence for civil proceedings in Georgia superior courts apply
at hearings. At the request of a party, the full board may review the
evidence and may hear witnesses or, if the board deems it advisable, parties or their representatives. Then the board will issue an award. The
former provisions for appeal are made a part of §114-708.11
The remaining additions and changes in chapter seven lack enough public importance to include here.
II.

A.

RECENT GEORGIA DECISIONS

Dual Employees & Independent Contractors

During the survey period, six cases dealt with the status of workers who
were injured.
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Corbin 3 involved the developing laborcontracting business. Corbin sued Georgia-Pacific Corp. in tort and alleged
that the negligence of one of its employees had injured Corbin while he was
working on a Georgia-Pacific project. Corbin was an employee of Gates,
who had agreed to be a front for Georgia-Pacific to get union labor on the
job. Georgia-Pacific defended on the ground that Corbin was indeed its
own employee and his sole remedy was under the act. 4 The jury found
Georgia-Pacific was not the employee-70,000 worth.
The facts in Jackson v. J B. Rush Construction Co., Inc. 5 differ from
those of Georgia-Pacific. Jackson worked for Sheffield, a subcontractor of
Rush, and was injured in an industrial accident while engaged in his
usual employment. He collected workmen's compensation benefits under
Rush's policy. Then he sued Rush in tort and claimed that Sheffield had
paid Rush the money for workmen's compensation insurance premiums.
This arrangement, Jackson said, amounted to Sheffield's maintaining the
workmen's compensation insurance; therefore, he should not be barred
from a tort action against Rush.
The court granted Rush's motion for summary judgment, and on appeal,
this was affirmed. Having chosen to collect workmen's compensation bene19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 205; GA. CODE ANN. §114-701.14 (Supp. 1976).
Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 206; GA. CODE ANN. §114-701.16 (Supp. 1976).
Ga. Laws, 1975, pp. 207-08.
Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 208.
137 Ga. App. 37, 222 S.E.2d 862 (1975), cert. applied for.
See GA. CODE ANN. §114-103 (Supp. 1976).
134 Ga. App. 445, 214 S.E.2d 710 (1975), cert. denied.
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fits from the general contractor, the employee will not be permitted to bite
the hand that feeds him. Two earlier cases"8 are distinguishable; there the
employees collected workmen's compensation benefits from their direct
employers, the subcontractors, and then sued the general contractors in
tort. Such suits are permitted.
An attempt was made in Chancy v. Pope27 to have a crop-duster pilot
declared an independent contractor. The evidence showed that Chancy
furnished the aircraft, all maintenance, a person to mix and load the dust
into the plane, all advertising and all other business expense; he gave Pope,
the pilot, instructions about the use of the plane, and required him to
satisfy the customer. 8 All that indicated that Pope was an employee, not
an independent contractor. Chancy argued that the pilot should have
flown no higher than 500 feet, but just before the crash he was flying at
2,000 feet-not where he reasonably might be expected to be in the performance of his work."9 The court concluded that he was in the air and that
was where he reasonably might be expected to be.
Without reciting the facts in Georgia Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brawley,30
the court affirmed the lower tribunals, which had held that where the
employer and insurer had insured the person as an employee, not as an
independent contractor, they were estopped to deny he was an employee
3
entitled to benefits. '
In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. City of Atlanta, 32 an Atlanta
plain-clothes detective was employed as a security guard at Weis Theatres,
Inc., to help maintain order if the need arose. The Atlanta Police Department requires its members to devote full time and attention to police
business and forbids their acceptance of employment or of a financial
3
interest in any business without the permission of the Chief of Police. 1
Members are deemed to be on duty and subject to call at all times, even
when they are off-duty. 4 The employee complied with all these rules. He
was killed while he was trying to quell a disturbance at the theatre, where
he was on duty as a security guard.
With a bit of logical rationalizing, the court found that the officer had
dual employment; if he had not been at the theatre as a security guard, a
police officer on duty would have been called, so the claimant's presence
26. Blair v. Smith, 201 Ga. 747, 41 S.E.2d 133 (1947), and Bli Const. Co. v. Knowles, 123
Ga. App. 588, 181 S.E.2d 879 (1971), cert. denied.
27. 136 Ga. App. 826, 222 S.E.2d 667 (1975).
28. Id. at 826-27, 222 S.E.2d at 668.
29. Id. at 827, 222 S.E.2d at 668. See discussion in the text accompanying note 64, infra.
30. 135 Ga. App. 763, 219 S.E.2d 176 (1985).
31. The court relied on GA. CODE ANN. §114-607 (1973), which says that an insurer who
issues a policy covering an employee ordinarily exempt from the act may not plead the
exemption as a defense.
32. 135 Ga. App. 390, 217 S.E.2d 647 (1975).
33. Atlanta Police Department Rules 481 and 618, cited id.
34. Atlanta Police Department Rule 482, cited id.
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was advantageous to the city as well as to the theatre. The original award
had been against the theatre only. The court of appeals reversed in part
and remanded the case to the board to determine Atlanta's proportionate
share. 5
In Howard Sheppard, Inc. v. McGowan, 6 the claimant, McGowan, applied for employment as a truck driver. An employee rode with McGowan
for one day and reported he did not pass a road test required by state
regulations; 37 another employee reported the same for the second day. On
the third day, McGowan was told to continue to drive and haul gravel. On
his first trip out, he was apprehended for speeding; while returning to the
quarry for his second load, he was killed in a collision at a railroad crossing.
The employer contended he would not have hired McGowan because he
did not qualify under the testing program. The speeding violation alone
justified that conclusion, the employer argued.
The court held that the employer got paid for the gravel the claimant
hauled and thereby benefited from his work. At least for purposes of the
act, he was an employee who was killed in an accident that arose out of
and in the course of his employment3
No trend is indicated in these decisions. The courts simply applied new
situations to old decisions and to the act.
B.

Computation of Benefits

Four cases present four situations on computation of benefits.
The first two appeals in Neal v. Insurance Co. of North America39 dealt
with a change-of-condition award for partial disability in favor of the employer and the insurer. The case decided on the third appeal" held that
the total number of weeks during which benefits are due must be computed
under the code section on partial disability," which has a time limit, rather
than the section on total disability, which has no time limit.2 A review of
both sections shows four factors limiting partial-disability benefits: (1) the
weekly amount is two-thirds of the difference between the average weekly
wage before the accident and after the accident; (2) the maximum weekly
benefit is $70; (3) in no case may the total collected exceed $24,500; (4)
the total weeks for partial disability payment is 400, from which must be
35. The court was construing GA. CODE ANN. §114-607 (1973).
36. 137 Ga. App. 408, 224 S.E.2d 65 (1976). See discussion under "Practice and Procedure" in the text accompanying note 125.
37. Georgia Public Service Commission, Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, cited id. at
409.
38. 137 Ga. App. at 411, 224 S.E.2d at 68.
39. 125 Ga. App. 152, 186 S.E.2d 552 (1971), and Neal v. Howard Johnson, Inc., 126 Ga.
App. 560, 191 S.E.2d 350 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 971 (1972).
40. 134 Ga. App. 854, 216 S.E.2d 626 (1975).
41. GA. CODE ANN. §114-405 (Supp. 1976).
42. GA. CODE ANN. §114-404 (Supp. 1976).
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deducted the number of weeks in which total disability benefits were collected.
In Williamson v. Gulf Insurance Co.,13 the court of appeals again stated
that tips are to be considered wages in computing the average weekly wage.
Even though tips are not paid by the employer, experience has shown that
they are definitely considered by the employer and the employee in setting
the wage for a job where tips usually are paid by customers. Regardless of
whether tips are considered in computing premiums for the insurance coverage, the employee loses them during a disability period and is entitled
to benefits computed on them.
Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Brock44 presents an interesting issue
on computation of death benefits to the dependent parents of a minor
killed on his job. The minor contributed his entire wage to a family common fund for the support and maintenance of the employee, his mother,
his younger sister, and his younger brother, all of whom claimed partial
dependency. His older sister was self-supporting and his stepfather received disability benefits, so neither claimed dependency. The mother
gave the employee spending money from the common fund as he needed
it.
In computing the amount of dependency, no deduction was made for the
spending money or for the board and lodging of the employee. Computation of dependency was made on the entire wage.45 I have no criticism of
the court's basic holding that "[wihere a deceased employee contributed
his entire wages to partial dependents, the workmen's compensation award
is the same as that which would be granted for total dependency.""
However, the court of appeals avoids a provision of the act that requires
the compensation to partial dependents to be computed on the proportion
of the wages contributed to them.47 It found a distinction between a wageearner who contributes only a portion of his earnings to his dependents and
one who contributes all his earnings but gets some back. "The mere fact
that the family gives the minor employee son spending money out of the
wages which he contributed to the common family fund"8 is not to be
considered a diminution of the entire wage concept." 49 Thus the court (1)
opens the temptation for the minor employee to make himself a withholding beneficiary before depositing his "net pay" and (2) overlooks the requirements of modern minors for large amounts of spending money that
43. 137 Ga. App. 79, 222 S.E.2d 885 (1975), cert. applied for.
44. 134 Ga. App. 903, 216 S.E.2d 700 (1975). See discussion in the text accompanying note
58, infra.
45. See GA. CODE ANN. §114-413(c) (Supp. 1976) and §114-414(c) (1973).
46. 134 Ga. App. at 903, 216 S.E.2d at 700, headnote 1.
47. Ga. Code Ann. §114-413(c) (Supp. 1976).
48. 1 interpret this to mean the family common fund, not to be an aspersion cast (or of
caste) upon the family.
49. 134 Ga. App. at 903, 216 S.E.2d at 700, headnote 2.
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might leave the fund with a net contribution of zero. I have to concede that
the court's holding is applicable to married males; those common funds,
unfortunately, are the first conception of modern wives.
The third part of the holding states: "Payments made in lieu of board
and lodging by a minor employee are not to be deducted in computing the
proportion of wages contributed to his partial dependents."50 This is contrary to the statute, which omits all reference to the age of the employee
and omits the "not" used by the court. 5' The court distinguished this
decision and that in Smith v. Travelers Insurance Co.," with the simple
explanation that Commercial Union deals with a minor and Smith deals
with an adult. With even less effect than a judge's doing so, I dissent.
Payments made to an employee by mistake or without an approved
agreement53 are gratuitous payments and are not recoverable from the
employee or from the insurer responsible for payments. In Continental
Insurance Co. v. Hickey,54 the court so held. The proper insurer may take
credit for payments made gratuitously by another insurer or by the em5
ployer, so that the employee does not have a double recovery.
Here again, I find no trend indicated. Many factors must be considered
when computing benefits owed to an injured employee.
C.

Dependents

Three cases decided during the survey period present different points
about dependents.
In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. City of Atlanta,56 there was an
illegitimate child of the wife of a plain-clothes detective. The detective was
killed while he was on his extra job at a theatre. There was an argument
that the child should not be considered a stepchild of the deceased because
the child was illegitimate and because his dependency on the deceased
detective had existed for less than three months prior to the accident.5 7 But
the court held that a stepchild of the father is conclusively presumed to
be dependent.
In Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Brock,55 the deceased employee
was a minor who had a mother and two siblings partially dependent upon
50. Id. at 903, 216 S.E.2d at 700, headnote 3.
51. GA. CODE ANN. §114-414(c) (1973).
52. 71 Ga. App. 24, 29 S.E.2d 709 (1944).
53. Workmen's Compensation Board Form No. 16.
54. 139 Ga. App. 31, __S.E.2d __
(1976).
55. Id.
56. 135 Ga. App. 390, 217 S.E.2d 647 (1975).
57. GA. CODE ANN. §114-414(c) in the fourth grammatical paragraph requires dependency
to exist for three months prior to an accident, but that refers to dependents other than the
wife and children.
58. 134 Ga. App. 903, 216 S.E.2d 700 (1975). The case was discussed under "Computation
of Benefits" in the text accompanying notes 44-52, supra.
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him while an older sibling and a stepfather were not dependent at all.
Although I disagree with the court of appeals over the amount of benefits
payable, the application of the facts to the two statutes providing for
determination of dependency59 properly results in this unusual situation in
which some members of the family are dependent while others are not.
Flint River Mills v. Henry0 is based on unusual facts. The employee
sustained fatal injuries in an industrial accident on December 10, 1973; but
almost three years later his dependents still have not received compensation benefits because of technical difficulties. At the time of his death, the
employee had six natural children under age 18; their mother had died
about two years earlier, and these children were living with their maternal
grandmother in a house being purchased by their father, the deceased.
Aside from their deceased mother's Social Security benefits, the deceased
employee was the sole source of support for these children.
After his first wife's death, the deceased employee remarried. At the
time of his death, he was living with his second wife and her six children-his stepchildren-under age 18. Their natural mother, the second
wife, was employed. Some of these children were receiving Social Security
benefits as a result of their father's death. It was undisputed that the
deceased used his income for the support of his natural children and contributed nothing for the support of his second wife or her children. The
deceased's natural children filed a workmen's compensation claim. On a
motion by the employer, the deceased's widow and his stepchildren were
made parties. At a hearing, the widow testified that she was not seeking
workmen's compensation for herself or her children.' Other actions attacked the constitutionality of the provisions of Code §114-414, which
established a conclusive presumption that stepchildren are wholly dependent upon a stepparent. The widow and her children did not answer
this last suit.
Here we find the unique situation in which the widow and the stepchildren of the deceased seek no part of the benefits, but the employer and its
insurer cannot pay benefits to the natural children of the deceased without
subjecting themselves to double payment because of the conclusive presumption. The case was before the supreme court on the sole question of
constitutionality, but the court would not decide the issue until administrative proceedings were complete. The dependency question remains unanswered2
With our cultural development,63 the future must hold some interesting
59. GA. CODE ANN. §114-413 (Supp. 1976) and §114-414 (1973).
60. 234 Ga. 385, 216 S.E.2d 895 (1975). See discussion under "Practice and Procedure"
in the text accompanying notes 123-125, infra.
61. Id.
62. Attorney Ben Kirbo, who represents the natural children of the deceased, advised me
in a telephone conversation that the case is on its way back to the supreme court.
63. Be it progressive or regressive or just abandoned, I have no comment.
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questions on dependency that cannot be answered with conclusive presumptions or perhaps even with rebuttable presumptions. What is the
dependency status of an unmarried law student who shares the bed, board
and love of a friend of the opposite sex where the friend provides all the
funds for this arrangement and then is killed in an industrial accident? Is
there a presumption? If so, is it conclusive or rebuttable? Is it in favor of
or opposed to dependency? (Presumptions on issues other than dependency are beyond the scope of this article.)
D. Negligence of Employee
Three cases give interpretations on §114-105, which disallows compensation for injury or death resulting from wilful misconduct of the employee.
In Chancy v. Pope,6 4 a crop-duster pilot drank two cans of beer approximately six hours before the crash in violation of FAA regulations. He was
flying at 2,000 feet over the airport even though the crop-dusting altitude
normally is 500 feet. The court held that neither of these acts was shown
to be the proximate cause of death.
In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bray,'5 the findings of fact showed
that the employee was crossing a public highway to get from his work area
to a parking lot provided by the employer. He was crossing the highway
300 feet from a pedestrian crossing with traffic light controls when he was
struck by a vehicle and sustained injuries to his head and both legs. The
full board affirmed the deputy director's denial of compensation, but the
superior court reversed; then the court of appeals reversed and reinstated
the denial made by the full board.
Judge Stolz, speaking for the majority in a 5-4 decision, gave an in-depth
review of the effect of violating penal statutes and reaffirmed the position
of the court set forth in previous decisions."
Technically, Hanover Insurance Co. v. Rollins67 raised the same questions as the Bray case, and the court reached the same conclusion: Compensation benefits were denied. The employee was injured in a collision
between his automobile and a farm tractor when the employee tried to pass
the tractor on the crest of a hill. The tractor began a left turn, and the
employee's car struck the left front wheel of the tractor. After setting forth
the facts and specifying the violations of statutes dealing with operation
of vehicles on the highway, the board found that employee's "actions as
described above proximately caused the collision, and, therefore, the acci64. 136 Ga. App. 826, 222 S.E.2d 667 (1975). See discussion in the text accompanying
notes 27-29, supra.
65. 136 Ga. App. 587, 222 S.E.2d 70 (1975).
66. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 169 Ga. 333, 150 S.E. 208 (1929), and Pacific Indemnity
Ins. Co. v. Eberhardt, 107 Ga. App. 391, 130 S.E.2d 136 (1963). See also Smith, Workmen's
Compensation, supra note 9, at 306.
67. 136 Ga. App. 595, 222 S.E.2d 91 (1975).
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dent and his injury are attributable to his wilful misconduct."68
Judge Clark, who dissented in Bray and concurred in Rollins, found a
difference in the facts:
In Bray the employee was crossing a country road to reach the company's parking lot. Here [Rollins] the employee violated those statutes
which forbid motorists from passing another vehicle on a hill, crossing into
the left lane of a highway marked with a yellow line to the right of the
center line. Bray's conduct may have been negligence but should not be
considered as malum in se. On the other hand, Rollins undertook the
wilful and conscious doing of an act of a criminal or quasi-criminal nature
which brought him within the statutory bar of "wilful misconduct."'"
The results in both cases are required if irresponsible acts of employees are
not to be condoned. The only difference I see between Bray and Rollins is
that one was walking and the other was riding.
E.

Change in Condition

Code § 114-709, which allows awards to be changed because of "change
in condition," usually is interpreted to mean a change in medical condition
or, more recently, a change in economic condition when either type of
change is great enough to affect the amount of benefits being paid. The
section also provides that any board-approved agreement on a change in
condition is conclusive, unless the agreement is obtained by fraud, accident or mistake.
In Williamson v. Gulf Insurance Co.,10 the employee alleged that two
agreements approved by the board had been obtained by fraud and mistake. In reversing and remanding the case, the court stated that the full
board and the superior court had the authority to change the amount of
the earlier settlement if it were based on fraud, accident or mistake, and
that this could be done after a hearing on a change in condition. "A failure
to include the tips in her total salary would require an award based on a
change in condition," the court said.7"
Handley v. Travelers Insurance Co.7" affirmed a change in condition
from 50% loss of use of the employee's left leg to a 20% loss of use-a
change in medical condition. In a previous appeal,73 a correction of an error
in an approved agreement had been made, and the case had been remanded to the board for a determination of a change in medical condition.
68. Id. at 596, 222 S.E.2d at 92.
69. Id. at 597, 222 S.E.2d at 93.
70. 137 Ga. App. 79, 222 S.E.2d 885, (1976), cert. applied for. See discussion in text
accompanying note 43, supra.
71. Id. at 82, 222 S.E.2d at 888.
72. 137 Ga. App. 281, 223 S.E.2d 478 (1976).
73. 131 Ga. App. 797, 798, 207 S.E.2d 218 (1974).
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Under §114-709, the board, on its own motion or on motion of either party,
has the authority to hear evidence of a change in condition.
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Caldwell7 dealt with a change in condition
affirmed by the court of appeals even though medical experts differed over
a degenerative spinal condition. The employee had suffered a knee injury
13 months earlier and alleged that the crutches, the cast and the weakness
of her knee had caused her to slip and fall while taking a bath and later to
fall down a flight of stairs. Some medical evidence at the hearing was
presented to the effect that twisting of the spinal column caused by the
weight of the cast during walking and the two falls could have exacerbated
the arthritic condition. The employer countered with medical evidence
that "physical exertions of a sexual nature" had exacerbated the spinal
condition. It was held that the employee had sustained a change in condi75
tion under the act.
Miller v. Argonaut Insurance Co. 7 1 is important, because it sets forth four
requirements for a change-in-condition award to an employee. The employee must show (1) that the condition has changed for the worse; (2) that
because of this change the employee is unable to work for any employer;
(3) that because of inability to work the employee has a total or a partial
loss of income; and (4) that the inability to work was proximately caused
77
.by the injury.
Fleming v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co."6 highlights the
significance of a change in economic condition. The employee had suffered
a compensable injury and had returned to work in a supervisory capacity
rather than at his regular heavy work. Then he was laid off for a cause
unrelated to his injury. The court held that a change in economic condition
had occurred. The employee had returned to work before he was able to
perform his regular duties, and he still was unable to perform them at the
time of his termination. Situations like this need to be guarded, because
they are susceptible to abuse.
F.

Proximate and Remote Causes of Injuries

This topic is applicable to time, distance and events. The distinction
between proximate and remote causes is not to be too rigorously pressed
in the application of the Workmen's Compensation Act.7 9 That principle
has been followed, quoted and cited on numerous occasions by both appellate courts, and it was used as part of the basis for affirming the change of
0
condition in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Caldwell,8
in which the employee
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

135 Ga. App. 640, 218 S.E.2d 653 (1975). See text accompanying note 80, infra.
Id. at 641-42, 218 S.E.2d at 654.
136 Ga. App. 101, 220 S.E.2d 89 (1975).
Id. at 103, 220 S.E.2d at 91.
137 Ga. App. 492, 224 S.E.2d 127 (1976).
Thomas v. United States Cas. Co., 218 Ga. 493, 494, 128 S.E.2d 749, 752 (1962).
135 Ga. App. 640, 218 S.E.2d 653 (1975). See text accompanying note 74, supra.
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developed a back condition 13 months after a knee injury.
Injuries occurring during lunch breaks and rest breaks continue to be
perplexing;" each case is decided independently.
Establishing rules to determine whether the cause of an injury is proximate or remote when it occurs during a break must be a problem that
neither the General Assembly nor the courts can solve. Some progress was
made by the court of appeals in Powell v. HartfordAccident & Indemnity
Co. ," which put on the employee the burden of establishing that his injury
arose both out of and in the course of the employment. In Powell, the
employee was injured during a coffee break. Although the time for the
break was included in his pay, there was no evidence indicating the employer exercised or had the right to exercise any control over the employee
during the break. The court specifically distinguished other cases in which
there was some element of control by the employer.
In City Council of Augusta v. Williams,13 a doctor's testimony that the
employee's work-related emotional stress "might or could" have contributed to his heart attack was coordinated with the rule against pressing too
vigorously the distinction between proximate and remote causes. The court
affirmed an award granting compensation. A glance at the bases for the
alleged "severe emotional stress" shows the inconsistencies and the impossibility of their real existence: "(1) he was fearful of losing his job, (2) his
beat was too large for one man, (3) he was required to ride alone in his
patrol car because the Augusta Police Department was understaffed, (4)
only three days previously he had been transferred from the morning shift
to the night shift, and (5) he had been required to attend court that morning."' If either (2) or (3) is true, there is no basis for (1); it appears that
(5) is simply a part of the job, and (4) usually occurs in jobs requiring work
around the clock.
Murray v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co."5 presents an interesting
study. The injury led to the amputation of the ring finger of the left hand,
and the ultimate award was based on a percentage of loss of use to the
entire hand. Although a finger is a part of the hand, each finger is a
scheduled member with a separate rating under Georgia Code §114-406,
as is the entire hand. The deputy director found that there was weakness
and some pain in the hand but doubted that the condition could be attributed to the amputation of the ring finger; he awarded compensation for
100% loss of the third finger. Judge Marshall, for the court, said the evidence clearly showed the existence of a neuroma, a nerve tumor on the stub
at the point of amputation, so the case had to be remanded for further
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Smith, Workmen's Compensation, supra note 9, at 303.
137 Ga. App. 187, 223 S.E.2d 236 (1976).
137 Ga. App. 177, 223 S.E.2d 227 (1976).
Id.
135 Ga. App. 870, 219 S.E.2d 472 (1975).
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findings on the effect of the neuroma on the hand."' The testimony of two
doctors leaves some question about the disability. 7
Certainly the classic of all cases decided during the survey period is
General Accident Fire & Life Insurance Co. v. Sturgis."" The employee
became ill at work and was comatose an hour and a half later. He was
taken to a hospital, where he remained unconscious until he died three
days later. The record showed that on the morning of the illness the employee had been working near toxic chemicals, but it did not show how
much he was exposed or whether he inhaled any toxic chemicals.
The pathologist who performed the autopsy stated, "[Tihe man was
suffering from an extensive pneumonia . . . , and in my opinion, this
bacterial infection caused his death. . . . The pneumonia was caused by
an organism called Diplococcus Pneumoniae, and this is the most common
cause of lobular pneumonia. It occurs usually - it may occur spontaneously or in this particular instance I judged it to have caused pneumonia
in a lung that had been damaged by inhalation of these noxious vapors. I
think this is a not uncommon situation with inhalation of a noxious gas." 9
First, the court held that "there is no question that the death arose 'in
the course of the employment' because he was at work when he became
ill."" Second,
an accident "arises out of the employment" when it is apparent to the
rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that there is
a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. . . . While, ordinarily,
an initial determination of this factual issue would be affirmed under the
"any evidence rule" . . . that rule does not lend itself to this case. 9
The court agreed with the employer that there was no evidence that the
employee inhaled any noxious fumes. The pathologist assumed that he did
because he worked at a place where such were regularly in use. "Ordinarily
it is the rule of circumstantial proof that the facts from which the main
fact is to be inferred must be proved by direct evidence. An inference
resting only upon an inference is not permissible."92
The court upheld the refusal of the board to find that the employee
inhaled any noxious fumes and stated: "indeed the record is barren of any
evidence, medical or otherwise, of what might have precipitated the devel,,93
opment of pneumonia ....
86.
87.
ANN.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 874, 219 S.E.2d at 475.
The attorney for the employer advised me that a settlement was made under GA. CODE
§ 114-106, and that's a good ending.
136 Ga. App. 260, 221 S.E.2d 51 (1975), cert. denied.
Id. at 260-61, 221 S.E.2d at 51.
Id. at 262, 221 S.E.2d at 52.
Id.
Id. See also Miller v. Gerber Products Co., 207 Ga. 385, 388, 62 S.E.2d 174 (1950).
136 Ga. App. at 263, 221 S.E.2d at
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Third, the court said "[tlhe burden of proof in a workmen's compensation case is upon the claimant to show that the employee suffered an
accidental injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment."'
There's the case-the court has said so. But, like many preachers who
do not stop when they finish the sermon, the court continued and made a
complete turn-around:
The employee is aided in his burden by the well-established presumptions
stated in the board's decision that when an employee is found dead in a
place where he might reasonably have been expected to be in the performance of his duties, it is presumed that the death arose out of his employment .... Without attempting to accept some [cases] as precedent and
to distinguish or reconcile others [cases cited], we simply find the presumption applicable to this case."
What happened? There is "indeed no evidence" that the death arose out
of the employment; no inference may be predicated on another inference;
the burden of proof is on the claimant. But there is another presumption
that ignores all that and says, like the first presumption, that when the
employee is found dead in a place where he might reasonably have been
expected to be in the performance of his duties, it is presumed that the
death arose out of his employment.
We now have two presumptions that present a prima facie case for the
employee, so the burden shifts to the employer to negate both presumptions, even though there is "indeed no evidence" to support either presumption. I would prefer to accept the doctor's presumption of inhalation
of toxic fumes rather than to have the case decided exclusively upon two
presumptions based on one single point. 7
G.

Aggravation of Pre-existing Condition

There are three factors to be considered under this topic: (1) aggravation
of a disease under the occupational-disease section,98 (2) aggravation of a
previous injury or condition, whether initially from an industrial accident
or otherwise, and (3) the effect of the statute of limitations.9
Chapter 114-8 is known as the occupational disease section and provides
compensation benefits for a limited number of diseases generally resulting
from specific categories of employment. Cases under this section are handled differently from the usual injury cases, as Insurance Co. of North
94.
95.
96.
97.

98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
0, Death, where is thy sting? With haste to the job my body bring.
GA. CODE ANN. ch. 114-8 (1973).
GA. CODE ANN. §§114-305 and -306 (1973).
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America v. Brannon""'demonstrates. There the employee claimed aggravation of a pre-existing lung condition. In an interlocutory order, the board
referred the case to the medical board,"' which found simply that the
employee "had a pre-existing disease which was aggravated by his employment." The employer appealed the decision and propounded interrogatories to the medical board. 02 The court of appeals found that the medical
board made no finding about the date of disability or the causation or the
employer's entitlement to apportionment, if any, under §114-805. The case
was remanded to the State Board of Workmen's Compensation to refer the
case to the medical board." ' The apportionment section provides that an
employer is liable only for that portion of the disability that is attributable
to the employment.
The important portion of Continental Casualty Co. v. Weise' °4 is the
court's statement that "[it is well settled that the aggravation of a preexisting infirmity, whether congenital or otherwise, is compensable ...
[and] well settled that where a disability results which is objectively
physiologically ascertainable, it is compensable although the onset of disability is imperceptible from day to day, and there is no one 'accident' at a
specifiable time and place to which the result may be attributable."'05 In
reversing the superior court and affirming the board's denial of compensation, the court stated that "contradictory evidence can authorize the denial of compensation [cites], as can the impeachment of the claimant
[citesl." 10
Sometimes an employee injured in an accident arising out of and in the
course of his employment continues to work for the same employer. If the
continuing employment aggravates the original injury over a short or long
period of time to such an extent that the employee later is forced to stop
work, the employee is considered to have sustained a second accidental
injury arising out of and in the course of the employment on the date that
he no longer was able to work."' 7 It doesn't matter whether time was lost
after the first injury. The same rule applies if, after the first injury, the
employee goes to work for another employer where he aggravates the first
.injury to such an extent that he is required to terminate his employment.
The rule also applies when the employee terminates his employment with
the second employer because of the continued aggravation and then makes
his claim for compensation against the original employer; he still is consid100. 137 Ga. App. 468, 224 S.E.2d 115 (1976).
101. See GA. CODE ANN. §114-819 (1973).
102. See GA. CODE ANN. §114-823(3) (1973).
103. 137 Ga. App. at 469, 224 S.E.2d at 116.
104. 136 Ga. App. 353, 221 S.E.2d 461 (1975).
105. Id. at 354, 221 S.E.2d at 462.
106. Id. at 354, 221 S.E.2d at 463.
107. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. White, 139 Ga. App. 85, S.E.2d Continental Ins. Co. v. Hickey, 139 Ga. App. 31, __

S.E.2d
(1976).

-

(1976), and
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ered to have sustained a "new" accident while employed by the second
employer." '
H.

Statute of Limitations

Since "employment" means "employment with the party from whom
compensation is sought,"'' 9 the statute of limitations runs separately for
each of the "two" injuries recognized when the employee keeps working
after an injury and aggravates the condition.2 0 It doesn't matter whether
he changed jobs between the two periods of disability or kept working for
the same employer. In neither case does the statute of limitations bar his
claim if he presents it within one year of each "new accident."
In Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Nolen,"' the insurer sent the employee several checks for benefits, and over the next year it made requests
for agreement forms. A claim was not filed by the employee within one year
from the date of the accident. A letter from the insurer to the employee in
July 1973 asked that the forms be sent in. A longhand postscript across the
bottom of the letter said, "They have nothing to do with the permanent
disability."
When a claim was made more than one year after the accident, the
courts held that the evidence supported the employee's testimony that
telephone conversations and letters from the insurer misled him about the
statute of limitations:
The conduct of defendant and its insurance carrier may be such as to
estop them from presenting the statutory limitation as a defense in bar of
the claim for compensation, if the effect of such conduct was to mislead
or deceive claimant, whether intentional or not, and induce him to withhold or postpone filing his claim petition until
more than a year had
2
elapsed from the occurrence of the accident."
I.

Notice

3
The Georgia Supreme Court, in Schwartz v. Greenbaum,"1
made a
major change in the requirements of notice from the employee to the employer. The notice, the supreme court said, "need not be given with a view
to claiming compensation, and is sufficient if it puts the employer on
notice of the injury so that it may make an investigation if it sees fit to do
s0.

'114

108. Smith, Workmen's Compensation, supra note 9, at 309, citing House v. Echota
Cotton Mills, Inc., 129 Ga. App. 350, 199 S.E.2d 585 (1973).
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., the cases cited at note 107, supra. The statute had run on action against
the first employer in House. 129 Ga. App. at 352, 199 S.E.2d at 587.
111. 137 Ga. App. 205, 223 S.E.2d 250 (1976).
112. Id. at 207, 223 S.E.2d at 251.
113, 236 Ga. 476, 224 S.E.2d 38 (1976).
114. 236 Ga. at 477, 224 S.E.2d at 39.
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Schwartz, the employee, had made a telephone call to his supervisor two
days after Schwartz got out of the hospital, where he had been treated for
a massive heart attack he had suffered at home. Two more days later,
Schwartz had another heart attack and was sent back to the hospital.
Relying on Royal Indemnity Co. v. Coulter,"' 5 the court of appeals held that
the telephone call was not sufficient notice because Schwartz did not say
that the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment."' On
certiorari, the supreme court expressly overruled Coulter, reinstated a 1953
decision of the court of appeals, "7 and remanded Schwartz.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Carnley,"8 decided by the court of
appeals earlier in the survey period, held that there was no notice at all to
the employer, so it was not affected by the supreme court's new ruling.
J

Evidence and Findings of Fact

At least ten cases decided during the survey period dealt with findings
of fact and the evidence on which they were based. The superior court and
the court of appeals are controlled by the so-called "any evidence rule,"
by which a case is affirmed if there is any evidence to support the findings
of fact of the deputy director and the board." 9 If the findings of fact are
based upon a misstatement of significant testimony, the finding will be set
aside and the case remanded to the board for new findings if a proper
understanding of the evidence might have caused the finder of fact to reach
a different conclusion.120
Lowe v. Bituminous Casualty Co."2 ' shows the extent to which the rule
is applied. The employee sprained his back while lifting cross-ties but
continued to work; when he complained to his foreman, he was given
lighter work. Seven days after the sprain, his employment was terminated.
On the tenth day after the injury (four days after termination), the employee sought medical treatment. The doctor testified that the employee
should make a full recovery after two or three weeks. The deputy director
made an award of four weeks.
In affirming the award, the court stated that there was evidence to
support the award, even though the employee testified at the hearing that
he was not working and had not worked since he had sprained his back.
"The findings were authorized by the evidence and cannot be set aside,"
the court said. 2 '
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

213 Ga. 277, 98 S.E.2d 899 (1957).
Schwartz v. Greenbaum, 136 Ga. App. 259, 221 S.E.2d 61 (1975).
Davison-Paxon Co. v. Ford, 88 Ga. App. 890, 78 S.E.2d 899 (1953).
135 Ga. App. 599, 218 S.E.2d 307 (1975).
See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carnley, 135 Ga. App. 599, 218 S.E.2d 307 (1975).
Blankenship v. Atlantic Steel Co., 137 Ga. App. 282, 223 S.E.2d 479 (1976).
135 Ga. App. 792, 219 S.E.2d 31 (1975).
Id.
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K.

Practice and Procedure

One-third of the cases decided during the survey period contain some
reference to practice and procedure, including appellate procedure.
In Flint River Mills v. Henry,'23 an attack was made on the constitutionality of the code section establishing a conclusive presumption that stepchildren are dependent upon a deceased stepfather. 2 ' The plaintiffs sought
an injunction restraining the deputy director from entering an award based
on that section. The plaintiffs should have raised the constitutional challenge in the hearing before the deputy director and then had the challenge
ruled on in the appeal to the superior court. Although the deputy director
is powerless to declare the act unconstitutional, resolution of the constitutional question can be made by judicial review on appeal to the superior
court."'
Perhaps the most valuable information that could be relayed under this
topic is found in Howard Sheppard, Inc. v. McGowan.' The court adopted
from the brief of the appellant what the court designates as the criteria by
which lawyers for both employers and employees should measure their
cases before advising clients to appeal:
1. A finding of fact by director or deputy director of the State Board
of Workmen's Compensation, when supported by any evidence, is conclusive and binding upon the court, and the judge of the superior court does
not have any authority to set aside an award based on those findings of
fact, merely because he disagreed with the conclusions reached therein
[cites].
2. Upon appeal from an award of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation granting compensation, evidence will be construed in a light
most favorable to party prevailing before the Board [cites].
3. Every presumption in favor of validity of award of Board of Workmen's Compensation should be indulged in by reviewing court [cites].
4. Neither Superior Court nor Court of Appeals has any authority to
substitute itself as fact finding body in lieu of Board of Workmen's Compensation [cites].
5. Weight and credit to be given testimony of witnesses and conflicts
in evidence are for determination by Workmen's Compensation Board
[cites].
6. Hearing director and full board are vested with exclusive authority
to weigh evidence in Workmen's Compensation Proceedings [cites].
7. Deputy director and the full Board of Workmen's Compensation as
fact finders have exclusive prerogative of weighing evidence, including
determinations of credibility of witnesses; the courts of appeal are bound
by findings if supported by any evidence [cites].
123.
124.

234 Ga. 385, 216 S.E.2d 895 (1975). See text accompanying note 60, supra.
GA. CODE ANN. §114-414(c) (1973).
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234 Ga. at 386, 216 S.E.2d at 897.
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8. The board, in arriving at the truth, may apply all of rules of law
with reference to the credibility of the witnesses testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which
they testify, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability
or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and
their personal credibility so far as the same legitimately appears from the
trial [cites].
9. The testimony of a witness is to be considered as a whole and not
in disjointed parts. Nor is the Department of Industrial Relations (now
Workmen's Compensation Board) bound in every way to accept the literal
statements of a witness before it, merely because such statements are not
contradicted by direct evidence. Implications inconsistent with the testimony may arise from the proved facts and in still other ways the question
of what is the truth may remain an issue of fact, despite uncontradicted
evidence in regard thereto [cites].In
L.

Liability Above the Compensation Act

One case, United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Day,' dealt with an
insurer's tort liability in inspections. Judge Clark quotes Johnnie Mercer,
the Savannah native who wrote, "Accentuate the Positive." The insurer,
Judge Clark said, "negative[d]" the allegation that its inspections were
made for purposes other than its workmen's compensation underwriting.
Having done this, the insurer was shielded from a tort action arising from
an alleged negligent inspection. " 9
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 410-11, 224 S.E.2d at 67-68.
136 Ga. App. 359, 221 S.E.2d 467 (1975).
Id. at 363-64, 221 S.E.2d at 471.

